Rules, Regulation, and Accountability
Rules are intended to serve the public, but their consequences depend on how they are written, enforced, and reconsidered over time. This week, Kimberley Strassel, Jonathan Turley, and Manhattan Institute scholars Alex Adams and Adam Jones examine that question from three different directions—from diesel regulations affecting working Americans, to financial conflicts at the Supreme Court, to Idaho’s experiment in systematically reducing its regulatory code.
Kimberley Strassel ’26
Kimberley Strassel examines the political battle over diesel as prices climb to $6.51 a gallon. Farmers, truckers, construction workers, loggers, and other diesel-dependent Americans are bearing the costs, even as both parties compete for working-class support. Strassel argues that the controversy illustrates the limits of populist politics when government regulation collides with the practical needs of the workers politicians are trying to win.
Justice and Justices’ Investments Should Be Blind
Jonathan Turley ’24 & ’26
Jonathan Turley examines Justice Samuel Alito’s decision to recuse himself from a major Supreme Court climate case amid questions about his investments in energy companies. While praising Alito for avoiding the appearance of a conflict, Turley argues the episode exposes a broader institutional problem: justices should not actively hold investments that can interfere with their work on the Court. His proposed solution is straightforward—Supreme Court justices should place their investments in blind trusts.
The Idaho Blueprint—How States Can Cut Rules and Regulations
Alex J. Adams & Adam N. Jones, Manhattan Institute
Manhattan Institute scholars Alex Adams and Adam Jones examine Idaho’s eight-year experiment with “Zero-Based Regulation.” Instead of assuming existing rules should remain, Idaho required agencies to justify the regulations they wanted to keep. The state ultimately eliminated roughly half of its regulatory code, with nearly as much reduction coming from recurring reviews as from the initial purge. The authors argue Idaho offers other states a model for making regulatory reform an ongoing part of government rather than a one-time exercise.